

The EU, Europe and their (non)nationalist States

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So why look at the state level (member states (MS))?

- They are THE essential building blocks of the EU
 - Must ratify EU Treaties (govts as the 'high contracting parties')

NO STATES = NO EU


- BUT, by joining the EU, traditional nation state → Member State (MS)
 - Bottom → Up: Commitment to legal and political processes
 - Top → Down: *Europeanisation/EU-isation* (Ladrech, 1994; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001)
- **European politics**: not domestic anymore but not yet international either
- *New Intergovernmentalism* post-Maastricht? (Bickerton *et al.*, 2015)

Bottom → Up: 6 features of MS and EU relationship

- Entry Date
- **Size**
- **Wealth**
- State structure
- Economic ideology
- **Integration preference**



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
Entry date

- Franco-German alliance (Paris-Berlin axis) at the heart of European integration (Moravcsik, 1998)
 - Still relevant today?
- Relevance of other four original members?
 - Benelux states, Italy
- New(er) states must accept *acquis communautaire*
- EU 15 v CEE states → Differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2012) or **reverse discrimination?** (Schimmelfennig, 2014)
- **EXIT DATE?**
 - Brexit 2019(?) (Geddes, 2014)



Size

- Size matters!
 - 4 cluster
 - Large, medium, small and very small state
 - Important for QMV and power and presence in the EU's political, economic and diplomatic influence (Wallace, 2005)
 - Small states prefer institutional structures of EU
 - Coordinate and build strategies to cope with disadvantages (Panke, 2010)
 - Not important for substantive EU policy issues
 - Economic policy
 - Domestic interests
 - Broad direction of EU
- EC coalition depends on policy domain and can form between MS with various sizes



Wealth

- EU committed to harmonious economic development from the outset
- BUT not necessary to expand budgetary commitment to assist less prosperous regions until SEM completion in 1992
- 2004, 2007, 2013 enlargements → poverty gap widen
- Divergence in wealth impacts workings of the EU
 1. “New pecking order|”: *demandeurs v net contributors*
 2. Different attitudes towards size and distribution of EU budget
 3. Different attitudes towards EU regulation, esp. environment and social policy

State structure

- Focus on internal convoluted structure of MS
- Presidential v parliamentary system
- Federal, unitary, quasi-unitary or union states
 - Principle of subsidiarity
 - Committee of Regions
- Since 1990s increased direct representation of local regions in Brussels (Tatham and Thau, 2014)
 - Important actors in EU lobbying scene
 - Tensions possible between MS, cities, local officials, etc. all of which seek input in EU policy-making



Economic ideology

- At the heart of what the EU is = creates conditions for economic integration through market-building
- Focus on
 - Right balance between state and market
 - Role of the EU in regulation
 - Broader Qs of economic governance
- Competing views between MS
 - Original 6: continental or Christian democratic capitalist model
 - Anglo Saxon model – also CEE preference
 - Nordic welfare model
 - Eastern bloc - a *myth*? (Goetz, 2005)



Integration preference I

- Substantial difference between public and elite attitudes towards EU integration process (*Sanders et al., 2014*)
 - Now in a phase of 'constraining dissensus' (*Marks and Hooghe, 2008*)




(Source: EB83, Spring 2015)

Integration preference II

- Other factors
 - Preference usually depends on issue at hand
 - Importance of *Intergovernmental Conferences* which pre-date Treaty changes
 - Membership of Eurozone
 - Treaty referendum in MS

(Source: EB83, Spring 2015)



Top → down: Europeanisation (EU-isation)

- EU-isation as nation building at EU level? (Mair, 2004)
- EU-isation theory (Bulmer and Radelli, 2005)
 - Top down process of change derived from the EU
 - Creation of new EU powers
 - European direction for MS domestic politics
 - Increased two-way interaction between EU and MS
 - Changes in external boundaries
 - Masking domestic manoeuvres
- EU-isation practice:
 - Initially observe changes in policy structures and system-wide domestic structures (Cowles Caporaso, Risse, 2001)
 - Then focus on pressures “coming down” from EU-level and different adoptive responses from each MS (Olsen, 2002)
- → Uploading, Downloading and Crossloading

France in/and of the EU I

- Path dependent policy positions (Lequesne, 2013)
 - CAP, CFSP, EU enlargement and EU economic government
- Relationship with other MS (Cole, 2001; 2008)
 - German/ French Tandem remain at centre of EU politics
 - But also important: Franco- British *entente cordiale*
- Public opinion characterised by *souverainisme* (Hainsworth et al., 2004) and *indifference* but in favour of EU membership (Duchesne et al., 2013)
- Progressive acknowledgement of EU norms

France in/and of the EU II

- Party politics (Mair, 2000) Europeanised but also shows resilience of traditional party system (Parsons, 2007)
 - EU-isation = hyper-presidentialisation? (Lequesne and Rozenberg, 2008)
 - But PM in charge of day-to-day operations (Lequesne, 2010)
 - Also the head of General Secretariat for European Affairs
 - The (still) rather weak Parliament has *some* oversight of EU issues (Sprungk, 2008)
 - But resolutions are non-binding!
- A clear institutional setting where EU issues can be discussed and debated is lacking
- Questions of democratic accountability at EU and national levels

Germany as *the* EU I

- 2 interpretations
 - Diplomatic/ IR perspectives of Germany's place in the world (Bulmer, 2013)
 - Domestic political perspectives and institutional integration (Börzel, 2006)
- Multilateral relationship with other MS, esp. France
- Public opinion diverse
 - Not a clear transition from 'permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks, 2008)
- Public policy formation through a European framework, with electoral support and often reactionary at the national-level

Germany as *the* EU II

- Main parties adopted pro-EU stance though limited input
 - Expt. The Leftist Party and sometimes the CSU
 - German government present at all stages of EU decision-making
 - *Bundestag* secondary role (Auel, 2006)
 - *Bundesrat* involved but not autonomous (Grünhage, 2007)
 - *German Constitutional Court* important: decisions about how EU law may penetrate German Basic Law (Schröder et al., 2009)
- Shift from public (legislative actors) to executive politics when considering EU
- Questions of accountability and legitimacy

UK out of the EU

- Elite 'EU-ised' in a non-EU-ised polity → uncertain about EU (politics), membership and preferred relationship with other MS (Allen, 2013)
- Public opinion constantly Eurosceptic (Hobolt, 2014)
- But British party politics clearly EU-ised (Daddow et al., 2015)
 - Most developed national parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation
- Institutional politics considerably transformed as a result of EU membership (Birch and Allen, 2009)
- Impact of devolution and Scottish representation in Brussels (Bulmer et al., 2014)
- *Effect of Brexit on policy-making in the UK?*

How to explain MS involvement in EU policy-making?

- Neofunctionalism (Haas, 1968)
- Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998: 501)
- BUT Europeanisation processes tell us that both MS and EU institution are equally relevant → EU as multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003)
- But is it really nation-building post-1992? OR possibly a phase of *new intergovernmentalism*? (Bickerton et al., 2015)
 - Deliberation and consensus = guiding norms of EU policy-making
 - Supranational institutions do not necessarily seek further/closer integration
 - Delegation increasingly to *de novo* bodies (e.g. ECB)
 - Challenges in domestic preference formation (esp. Euroscepticism) is a factor shaping integration
 - High and low politics are blurred
 - EU is in a state of disequilibrium → *Where are we heading?*