with the things they know', and would ultimately be more sensitive to constituents' needs than a parliamentary system (Mitrany 1965: 140; also Ashworth 1999: 93–103). The problem with this position is that it pays no attention to the generation and representation of interests. How do functional assemblies determine what needs to represent? How do they prioritize among different constituencies and interests? Or as James Mayall (1975: 254) notes, 'if the state, and hence the criterion of national interests, are dissolved, how and to whom do...needs present themselves?' As we shall see in Part IV, this argument recurs in various guises in recent debates over democratic legitimacy in the EU.

'A Working Peace System', reproduced in Chapter 2, is clearly a normative document, setting out an agenda for international change. Yet, as David Mutimer (1992: 23) points out, it could also be read to imply a functional *explanation* of integration: that is, the supply of functional organs at the international level is explained by the need to solve a growing number of transnational technical problems. In this text, Mitrany portrays functionalism as a form of 'federalism by instalments'. Note, however, that in many other writings he explicitly denies that a species of federation is an ultimate end goal of integration, projecting instead a global web of technical administrative agencies.

Transactionalism

Transactionalism or 'communication theory' focuses on the social rather than political or economic dimensions of integration. In contrast to federalism, the transactionalist approach does not presuppose a specific legal and institutional framework. In contrast to functionalism, it does not concern itself with the satisfaction of practical welfare needs, but rather with the conditions necessary to create and maintain a sense of community among the populations of different countries (Pentland 1975: 36). Pioneered by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in the 1950s, transactionalism views integration as a process of cultural assimilation, leading to the formation of international 'security communities' (a concept first introduced by van Wagenen in 1952) in which peoples are linked in bonds of mutual trust and identification, and in which war is no longer considered possible. Simply stated, Deutsch's vision of integration as the formation of security communities relies on the notion that international transactions – communication, migration, mutual services, military collaboration, even tourism – trigger processes of social-psychological learning which in turn produce common identities and trust among social actors.

In the transactionalist model, integration has two key dimensions. The first is a process of *social* integration, leading to the formation of

'pluralistic' security communities. In such communities states retain their legal independence but interactions are guided by feelings of 'we-ness' and by 'dependable expectations of peaceful change' (Deutsch 1969: 122; van Wagenen 1965). An example of a pluralistic security community is Norway and Sweden, where neither have in recent memory imagined solving political conflicts by force. The second dimension is a process of *political* integration. Once pluralistic community formation has taken place, political elites may opt to build common supranational institutions, thereby producing 'amalgamated' security communities (essentially federal unions) (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6; Puchala 1970a: 184). However, amalgamation is not a necessary or per se desirable outcome. Indeed, Deutsch felt that pluralistic security communities were a more likely, more viable, and, because of their greater durability, more effective way of promoting international peace than political unions (Deutsch 1969: 122). He cautioned that premature efforts to achieve unified government without first attaining a high level of social integration would be self-defeating and might increase rather than mitigate conflict. This would be especially true if a centralized 'federal' authority was established prematurely, since the break-up of federations often leads to civil war. Moreover, he warned, the political unification of unequal partners may institutionalize the inequality and give a cachet of legitimacy to the exploitation of the weak by the strong (Merritt and Russett 1981: 9–10).

Deutsch's approach to international integration is firmly rooted in the study of nationalism and nation-building. Growing up in a multinational state, Czechoslovakia, which suffered a great deal during the war, Deutsch was drawn to the study of nationalism and the formation of large-scale communities (Merritt and Russett 1981: 6). In his first published works, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953a) and 'The Growth of Nations' (1953b) he explored theoretical and empirical linkages between communication patterns and national community. He presented a new model of a 'nation' or 'people' as a 'community of social communication', in which membership essentially consists in the ability and inclination to communicate more effectively, and on a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders (Deutsch 1953a: 70–1). He also introduced the concept of 'social mobilization' as the process whereby people become uprooted from their traditional communities and become available for new patterns of communication and behaviour. This process, he argued, increases the likelihood of integration (i.e. the formation of new pluralistic communities) among people who already share the same language, have compatible value systems, mutually responsive elites, and adequate communication channels.

In the pioneering study, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957) (see Chapter 3) Deutsch and his Princeton colleagues apply these ideas to study community-building processes in this area. Through detailed examination of historical cases of integration and disintegration they describe the key features of political integration in the North Atlantic area from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. They find that community formation depends less on formal structures of joint decision-making (as argued by federalists) and more on a development of mutual sympathy, trust and loyalties; in short, of a 'we-feeling', which results in mutual perception of needs and mutual responsiveness in the process of decision-making (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). By comparing individual cases with respect to a range of indicators, they attempt to generalize the conditions favourable to integration. They find that the formation of political communities depend less on geopolitical factors such as a common external threat and more on the complementarity of value systems and high levels of mutual responsiveness.

Associated chiefly with the work of Deutsch and his Princeton colleagues in the 1950s, transactionalism won wide support among American political scientists throughout the 1950s and 1960s and even into the 1970s. Contributors to the approach include Bruce Russett (1963, 1970, 1971), Helen Feldstein (1967), Theodore Caplow and Kurt Finsterbusch (1968), and Donald Puchala (1970a, 1970b, 1981). A major reason for the popularity of the approach was its 'scientific' character, which enticed scholars to use the newest technological developments in data collection and analysis. A champion of the behavioural revolution in American political science, Deutsch stressed the need to test theoretical conjectures against empirical data. To him, integration was a quantitative concept that could be directly observed and measured. As a result, his works assembled and analysed a large amount of statistical data on population movements, language assimilation and the flow of international transactions such as trade and mail. In *Nationalism and Social Communication* he shows that it is possible to empirically ascertain the existence of national communities by observing people's communication behaviour. The same logic is applied to international community formation, which Deutsch argues can be measured by the volume, context and scope of international transactions over multiple ranges of social, economic, cultural and political areas (Deutsch 1954; Puchala 1970b: 742–3). To ascertain whether integration has taken place, Deutsch uses a statistical tool called the 'index of relative acceptance', which measures the ratio of extra-regional relative to intra-regional communication and transactions. Integration is indicated by a higher volume and range of communications between community members than between members and outsiders (1956: 149). The more varied and numerous the transactions

among a group of states, the more pronounced and solid the international community is likely to be (Deutsch 1969: 101).

The idea that states can learn to govern their mutual relations without giving up sovereignty to supranational institutions (i.e. without 'amalgamation') has made the transactionalist approach popular with policymakers and scholars (Pentland 1975: 13–14). Yet problems of operationality have weakened the approach as a theoretical tool. While transactionalists emphasize the study of manifest transaction flows – ranging from flows of trade, mail, travel, migration, to the exchange of university students and translations of books – critics have charged that evidence of increasing transactions is not a good indicator of 'integration' because it does not directly measure the growth of community or sense of mutual obligation, which may lag far behind interactions. Another problem related to measurement is the relativistic character of Deutsch's concept of integration. As Inglehart (1968: 121) observes, Deutsch's estimation of integration is based on zero-sum assumptions. More integration within Europe presupposes relatively fewer transactions with the rest of the world. This makes it impossible to determine whether the world as such is becoming more integrated.

Even if we accept that transactions are a valid indicator of integration, this makes transaction analysis a descriptive rather than an explanatory tool. As Puchala (1970b: 762) argues, transaction flows may reflect regional integration but they do not necessarily *cause* integration – indeed they may be *caused by* integration. This points to a deeper problem in transactionalism, namely the failure to specify a theoretical relationship between transaction flows and social assimilation on the one hand and political change on the other. Transactionalism holds that, under certain conditions, processes of social assimilation lead to integration. Yet, as critics contend, the paradigm never specifies the causal relationship between social assimilation and political change (see Fisher 1969: 288–9; Haas 1970: 626; Hoffmann 1963: 526; Inglehart 1968: 122; Nye 1968a). As Fisher (1969) notes, social assimilation is a psychological variable relating to the attitudes of mass publics, whereas political integration (whether in the form of pluralistic or amalgamated security communities) can be described as a variable relating primarily to the behaviour of political elites. With the exception of Bruce Russett (1963), who looks at how the existence of an Anglo-American security community affects the behaviour of individual decision-makers, most transactionalists seem satisfied with demonstrating covariance between social assimilation at the mass level and the growth of political communities. This leaves open the question of how the attitudes of mass populations become the basis for altered government policies.