The EU – Russia relations: A report on the study half day By Lucie Batouskova
On 11 February 2015 the SLAS department of the University of Portsmouth organised a half-day on the EU-Russia relations. Three speakers were invited to talk about the changing – and often tense relations between the EU and Russia, which have been seriously affected by the recent Ukrainian crisis. The EU’s non-recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea have led to introduction of EU sanctions against Russia. At the same time, Russia is the EU’s biggest neighbour and an important trading partner. Supplies of oil and gas make up a large proportion of the Russia’s exports to Europe. The study half-day aimed to contextualise recent events and offer different views on how they could redefine the relations between the EU and Russia. As a SLAS student at the University of Portsmouth I am proud to say that the event went up to the highest expectations of unexpectedly high number of participants. The theme of the event was very topical and the atmosphere of the half day was inspiring. This report should serve as a reminder of the event as well as useful study material for those who could not attend.
Structure of the report
Due to the large amount of quality information presented during the half day and the high relevance of the topic I have decided to structure the report as follows: after a short introduction the report is divided into three topic/speaker specific sections which will provide detailed information of the speakers’ arguments and findings.
For the clarity of the report each section includes a paragraph called “Bigger picture: What is the future?,”which provides the reader with the summary of the main argument of each speaker, contextualisation of the Ukraine crisis in the topic of the presentation and speakers’ opinions on the future evolution of the EU-Russian relations. This structure should allow the readers to pick and choose the information most relevant to their interest while providing the EU-Russian relations enthusiasts with detailed report on the event.
1. Sean Roberts (University of Portsmouth) – Putin’s Agenda | · Qualifications: BA (Politics, University of Bath), MA, PhD (Politics, University of Birmingham)
· Role Title: Lecturer in International Relations and Politics |
2. Ed Stoddard (Free University of Berlin) – Energy in the EU-Russia Relationship
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1. Paul Flenley (University of Portsmouth) – The End of the EU-Russia Partnership after Ukraine?
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· Qualifications: MA (Hons) Modern Russian Studies (St.Andrews University), Ph.D Political Science (Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham)
· Role Title: Subject Leader and Principal Lecturer in Politics and International Relations |
Guess what my plans are… |
- Session 1: Sean Roberts (University of Portsmouth) – Putin’s Agenda
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Mr Sean Roberts started his presentation by bringing the attention of the audience to why it is important to understand the agenda of the Russian president Vladimir Putin. He reminded us that there are general concerns about the military power of Russia and that with annexation of Crimea feelings of panic have spread across Europe. He also stressed that Putin is a strong character who has an influence on both domestic and foreign policy of Russia. In his presentation Mr Roberts offered the audience his explanation of Putin’s agenda, arguing that Putin is a pragmatist. His presentation was structured around 3 arguments presented in different articles published by media in the last years, which he used as examples to illustrate what the agenda of the Russian president really is. First of the articles presented Putin as an “ethnic Russian nationalist.” Fears arise from this perception about possible intentions of his to expand Russian Federation to the West. Second article quoted Hillary Clinton, a former United States Secretary of State, U.S. Senator, and First Lady of the United States, 2012 claim that Putin wants to restore the former USSR. The third article also speculated about Russian intentions of regaining some of its former holdings, namely Finland.
Putin as an “ethnic Russian nationalist”
Mr Roberts’ perception of Putin’s agenda, based on years of observation of his political actions and speeches, is that Putin is in reality a pragmatist. That means, Mr Roberts explained, that he follows a long term agenda and his actions are based on both local and global events to which he reacts. He explained Putin’s “ethnic Russian nationalism,” portrayed in The Washington Post on March 19, 2014, as a reaction to strong nationalist feelings among Russian public. He argued that Putin has rarely promoted extreme nationalism. Russia has adopted liberal laws and its economy is also liberal in character. Mr Roberts reminded us that Vladimir Putin has also made Russia a part of the World Trade Organization, which had been resisted by nationalists. However, he stressed, Putin’s stand on the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea have boosted his approval ratings in Russia. He described Russian public as conservative nationalists. He added that in 2012 77% of respondents opposed the same sex marriage and showed that statistics published in January 2015 said that 55% of Russians thought that Stalin had played a positive role in the history of Russia. Mr Roberts stressed that Putin’s foreign policy is driven by domestic policy and argued that Putin’s agenda is to keep a lid on nationalism but appeal to the electorate.
Putin wants to restore the USSR
Then he moved on to comment on the Hilary Clinton’s claim that “Putin wants to restore USSR” which has been reclaimed by various media. This was a reaction on Vladimir Putins calling for deeper political and economic integration into a “Eurasian Union”. (Author’s note: Subsequently the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU) came to force on 1 January 2015. It is a “common economic space” which should eventually ensure free movement of goods, services and capital across a single market of 165m people from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.) The speaker argued that this is not the case of attempting to restore former USSR political union and explained that the creation of EEU was a Putin’s reaction on creation of the EU and increasing globalization. He stressed that the EEU, loosely based on the EU, is an attempt to create a trade block. It is a liberal economic project that should enable Russia to stay relevant in the region and compete with powers like China or the EU at a global level. A step, as he reminded us, that was necessary to take promptly as the financial reserve of Russia is shrinking.
Putin wants to reclaim hegemony in Eastern Europe
Finally Mr Roberts presented his opinion on speculations about Putin’s intentions to regain its former holdings in form of states like Finland, or Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which had appeared in newspapers like Telegraph or Independent. He admitted that the annexation of Crimea and following fights in Ukraine meant disruption of the calm borders that have been there since 1991. This has obviously caused a shockwave in the West. He also mentioned development of new nuclear weapons in Russia as well as big investments of the Russian government into the army capable of large and distant actions. While these factors can cause understandable fears, Mr Roberts reminded us of the historical, economic and political importance of Ukraine for Russia. He again explained Putin’s actions in Ukraine as reactionist. Putin reacted to the fall of Yanukovich and possible threat of presence of West in Sevastopol- crucial strategic and military point for Russia, which enables it to access the Mediterranean. While Russian presence and influence in Ukraine is vital for Russia it is not the case in the above mentioned countries. Mr Roberts therefore argued that it is not probable that Russia would attempt to question or attack the sovereignty of these countries and put itself to even bigger risk of jeopardizing its relations with the EU- its biggest trading partner. He also mentioned that while the levels of anti-Americanism are high in Russia, Russian agenda is not anti-European.
Bigger Picture: What is the future? Should Russia look for new friends?
The main argument of Mr Sean Roberts was that Putin’s agenda is not very ambitious. He has a long term plan that includes maintaining stability of Russian Federation and its relevance in the region and the world. In order to achieve this, he needs to react to the actions of other global actors whose actions might present a threat to his plans for Russia. In conclusion Mr Roberts presented his thoughts of possible development of current situation. One of them would be to punctuate the equilibrium in Ukraine by openly engaging Russian army in the conflict and eventually break its “good” relations with the EU and consequently all the West. Russia would then probably have to emphasize its relations with Asia in order to secure “new friends.” At the domestic level the EU economic sanctions are already causing economic problems and Russia has started to be forced to reduce social spendings. Mr Roberts suggested that this could in medium to long term cause public discontent and force Putin to make reforms or even step down from his current position. He finished his speech with a note that the key signal for the West that “things are not going well” in Russia would be the government dismissal.
- Session 2: Ed Stoddard (Free University of Berlin) – Energy in the EU-Russia Relationship
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In the second session of the EU-Russia half day Mr Ed Stoddard explained the role that energy plays in the EU-Russia relations. In his presentation he introduced the concepts of petro-states and carbon democracies and explained the two levels of energy interdependence between them. He argued that the relations of the EU and Russia are by large part determined by their dependence on each other in terms of energy. Finally he also suggested what factors could make a change to the current situation and offered his views on the future of Russia and its relations with the EU.
Petro-states and carbon democracies
Mr Stoddard began his session with introduction of the concepts of petro-states and carbon democracies to the audience. Countries known as petro-states are rich in natural resources. These countries, including Russia, are extremely dependent on sales of their resources to other countries. He stated that roughly 50% of the Russian GDP comes from oil and gas sales. He also mentioned that in academic literature these states, also referred to as ‘rentier states,’ were argued to suffer from an ‘oil curse’ as the wealth from oil and gas often helps to facilitate authoritarian regimes. It also allows the political authorities to buy off political rivals and build strong political clans or use the money to buy off or repress population of their countries.
Contrary to petro-states, Mr Stoddard explained, carbon democracies lack sufficient natural resources to power their economies and are dependent on oil and gas from countries like Russia. He made a note that these can be called ‘oil states’ too, for common life standards of their societies are ‘fueled by oil.’ The legitimacy of carbon democracies rests on their ability to secure sufficient resources for the society to function. Then he reminded the audience that the EU belongs to the group of carbon democracies saying that EU, lacking its own sufficient resources, is dependent on supply of oil and gas from other countries, with Russia providing 39% of gas and 33% of oil delivered to the EU.
Two levels of interdependence: security of demand and security of supply
Mr Stoddard argued that the mutual interdependence lies in the concern for security of demand on one side and security of supply on the other. According to his presentation Russia is a typical petro-state with concerns for security of demand for its natural resources while European states can be labeled as carbon democracies dependent on security of supply of these. It seems like an ideal situation, so what is the problem then? Mr Stoddard reminded us that the relations are not only about economics but also political tensions. He argued that in the case of the EU-Russia relations the interdependence is complex and discussed risks related to the security of resources that each party must consider.
Firstly, he described three types of actors that affect security of supply in the EU. These would be sources, routes and counterparties. There is always a risk for the EU that Russia will ‘cut off’ its resources for Europe but the routes for delivering oil and gas are equally important for the security as they lead through countries like Ukraine, where unrests can put the security of supply to risk. The security is also influenced by counterparties which were described as market actors. Many of them, including gas stations, are private companies. Mr Stoddard warned that at this level the EU needs to be careful about potential bankruptcy of the actors and political investment risk. He also stressed that to create better security of supply the EU tries to diversify the sources and routes (Turkey was mentioned here) as concentrating on the Russian source and route gives Russia considerable leverage in the relations.
On the Russian side, Mr Stoddard explained, the security of demand depends on buyers, routes and counterparties. As the EU is the main buyer of Russian gas, Russia tries to hinder its efforts to secure other sources and routes. Other risk for the security of demand are other producers accessing the EU market and general possibility of shifts to other sources of energy. Mr Stoddard stressed that counterparties also play an important role in this issue for they have funds and technologies necessary or access resources that are difficult or expensive to reach.
Bigger picture: What is the future? Big game changers?
To draw a bigger picture and contextualize current events in the light of his presentation Mr Stoddard reminded the audience that the situation in Ukraine is an example of Russian use of geo-politics which involves military action as opposed to geo-economics that EU uses in form of economic sanctions that target Russian individuals, companies and organizations that actively support pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine. How does the future look for Russia then? Mr Stoddart marked that Russian economy is currently experiencing problems because of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on some of its individuals and companies. These sanctions might be lifted but he suggested that this will not happen soon. He also said that the drop in oil prices has an influence on Russia and puts it in a disadvantage. The prices dropped partly because of the Eurozone crisis but Mr Stoddard pointed out other factors like growing shale frackling in the US that will decide about the future of oil prices and therefore the Russian economy. He also touched up on the possibility of other suppliers entering the EU market. This according to Mr Stoddart depends on the evolution of situation in Saudi Arabia and possible end of violence in Lybia. In final words he mentioned that mostly investment question and cost of alternatives are crucial for the Russian future.
- Session 3: Paul Flenley (University of Portsmouth) – The End of the EU-Russia Partnership after Ukraine?
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The third speaker of the afternoon Mr Paul Flenley talked about the shifts in relations between the EU and Russia over the last twenty years. He argued that there is a problem with communication because the two partners have different priorities and values. Then he presented an overview of the history of their relations and a recent shifts in Russian self-identity and suggested that it can help explain the current situation. He argued that the Ukraine crisis is not the beginning but culmination of the problems between the two parties. Finally he offered his opinion on the immediate cause of the crisis in Ukraine and discussed the possibilities of the future of Russia and its relation with the EU. He suggested that the ‘way out of this situation would be to create a Common Space of Cooperation between the EU and Eurasian Union that would help to end the unipolar and bipolar approaches to the area and recognize interests of all parties.
Assymetry in priorities – values and interest gap
After giving a brief overview of the structure of the EU Russian relationship in terms of treaties and agreements that started with 1991 Partnership with new Democratic Russia, Mr Flenley suggested that over the time the EU tried to lock Russia into unipolar Europe based on European norms and values that are significantly different from those of Russia. He reminded the audience that while the EU’s priorities are democratization and human rights, Russia prefers stability, security and strengthening of state. These priorities are reflection of their interests. Mr Flenley said that that the EU is interested in opening of markets and transparency in business while Russian economy still has a strong state input, especially in the energy sector (Gazprom). He summarized the differences by stating that Russia is interested in traditional as opposed to post-modern state and rejects the idea of the EU centric unilateral order. It opposes to the use of conditionality that the EU projects on its neighbours in order to transform them to open, liberal democratic states. He stressed that Russia sees itself as an equal partner to Europe and does not entirely accept the concept of the EU with all its institutions. President Vladimir Putin opposes the EU-centric approach to the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia also prefers to communicate with the heads of states rather than the EU as a whole.
Historical legacy of the EU-Russia relationship and shifts in Russian self-identity
The fact that should not be omitted, as Mr Flenley reminded to the audience, is the historical legacy of the relationship. Then he explained that after the fall of the USSR Russia has lost its power over many East European countries, many of which have later become members of the EU. Therefore, he argued, Russia has lost its prestige as its natural sphere of influence shifted towards Europe. He reminded us that after earlier 1990s romantic period of westernization in Russia, the disillusion came when ‘the great power’ Russia was not invited to become a member of NATO. As a consequence Russia sees NATO as an anti-Russian coalition. Mr Flenley also raised a point of shifts in Russian self-identity in 2000s that should not be overlooked. After a period of problematic events (NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 change, Russo-Georgia War in 2008, Eastern Partnership in 2009 and Problems with individual member states) Russian perception of the EU changed and president Putin showed a renewed pragmatic interest with the West, based on mutual interests, technical cooperation and moving away from conditionality. He also stressed the importance of the right of Russia to defend interests of Russians elsewhere. Mr Flenley also suggested that from 2012 onwards a new discourse has been found in traditionally conservative Russia. That is Russia promoting itself as a defender of traditional European values as opposed to decadent Western society. Part of this approach, he added, is a tendency to be suspicious of Western block NGOs in order to prevent their influence in Russia.
Shared neighbourhood
Mr Flenley then moved onto the question of the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia and argued that the EU underestimated the importance of Ukraine to Russia which is based on more than economics. He said that the EU is confident about its ‘external government’ approach to its neighbourhood, which means promoting its values by offering certain advantages (possibly membership) in exchange for domestic reform that would accommodate European values and norms. This approach has functioned in many of its neighbouring countries, some of which have become members of the EU. However, Mr Flenley reminded, Russia sees a threat in growing influence of the EU to its non-member neighbours. The EU, he added, is trying to ensure stability on its borders by offering as much to its neighbours as to EU member states in order to offset consequences of enlargement for those left out. According to Mr Flenley not doing so could lead to rejection of democracy in neighbouring countries and present a potential threat to the EU.
Differently from the EU influence in the neighbourhood is important for the dignity of historically proud Russia which, after the fall of the USSR, has lost its prestige in the region. Mr Flenley claimed that the self-perception of Russia depends highly on whether Russia is or is not capable to project influence on its neighbouring states, significantly so Ukraine.
Security issues – immediate cause of the crisis
Mr Flenley then brought the attention of the audience to the security issues that “have overlaid the relationship.” He argued that the crisis in Ukraine is not beginning but a culmination of problems as they reflect Russian fears over losing its influence in the region. He reminded us that Ukraine is a particularly important sphere of influence for Russia. “Crimean naval base,” he continued, “is strategically important for Russian security and Russia is worried about the EU and NATO enlargements to former soviet space.” (Georgia and Ukraine were mentioned here). He added that the tensions in Russia have also grown about the EU soft power in Ukraine while 2004 Orange Revolution took place and the unilateral actions of the US and the EU in Kosovo, North Africa and Middle East also feed into Russian security concerns and that the lack of a pan-European security architecture that would include Russia causes that the situation is unlikely to improve soon.
Mr Flenley marked that the immediate cause of the crisis in Ukraine was the Vilnius summit of Eastern Partnership in November 2013 where the EU aimed to sign new Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) between the EU and some partner countries including Ukraine. He explained that Russia reacted with a complain about not being allowed to see a draft of an agreement that includes its neighbour and accused the EU of being offensive and trying to buy off Ukraine, not including Russia in the process. He added that there are contradictions in the views on this issue as other countries argue that Ukraine is a sovereign country that does not have to inform Russia of its decisions.
Bigger picture- What is the future? Back to block mentality?
Finally the speaker moved to the question of possible scenarios of future. The main argument of his presentation was that the EU-Russian relation is one where the parties ‘talk past each other’, therefore it is difficult for them to understand each other and cooperate on different issues. He suggested that even though some options for Russia include moving away from Europe to create a separate model of modernisation based on strong state or re-orientation of interests to China, he added that these do not present a solution for the need for modernisation. He stressed that Russia needs a diversification from raw materials economy and concentrate on new technology, innovation, knowledge economy and inward investment. He mentioned that this has been recognised by Putin and Medvedev from 2010 but obstacles in form of corruption and lack of transparency in business prevail. He also added that “Russian conservatism and greater control discourages innovative intelligentsia”
He stressed that there is a need for Russia and Europe to maintain their relations to which the Ukraine crisis presents an obstacle. He reminded the audience of the EU dependence on Russian gas and oil and that on the other side the EU is accounting for 75% of the foreign investments in Russia. He argued that Russian nationalism and anti-westernism and Putin’s ‘personal relationship with the EU’ brought return to the bloc mentality into the crisis. In conclusion he suggested that a possible solution to this situation would be to make an end to unipolar and bipolar approach to the area and create a Common Space of Cooperation between EU and Eurasian Union that would recognize geo-strategic interests of Russia, geo-economic and geo-political position of states between and the asymmetry of priorities and interests with neighbours. He argued that this would benefit all parties: Russia and current elite by lifting the EU sanctions and recognition of its influence in the region; the EU would benefit from stability on borders and economic interests and neighbours in-between could avoid impossible choice between EU and Russia.
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